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RELIABILITY'S ROLE IN KEY PROJECT DECISIONS
Haggai Cohen « - ^ 
Director: Reliability, Quality and Safety 
Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Hq
Tb present a brief -summary of the role 
played by reliability in the key project 
decision' Making process, this paper is 
arranged in an outline form. We will 
discuss the Establishment of Early Re- 
quireHents, Preliminary FMEA T s During 
Conceptual Design, Design Trade-off 
Studies and Participation in Baseline 
Meetings and Milestone Reviews, Periodic 
Beliability Assessment - Long Poles in 
the Tent, Selection of Candidates for 
Inflight maintenance, Special Reliability 
Analyses - Suspected Trouble Areas, Hard- 
ware Storage and Refurbishment Problems, 
Special Requirements on Experiments, 
Reliability Data Base - Functional Note- 
books, Utilization of FMEA/SFP Data, and 
the "Lessons Learned" Report.
EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF REQUIREMENTS
The AAP R&QA Program Plan (NHB 5300.5 - 
May 1967) was built upon 200-2 and 250-1 
documents and incorporated them as part 
of the document. It supplemented them 
in specific areas such as -
Data Trend Monitoring 
Management Control of Single Failure 
Points
Specific program directives providing 
more detailed requirements than NHB 
5300.5 in selected areas:
Reliability, Quality and Safety 
Auditing
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
and Single Failure Point Identifi- 
cation and Control
Nonconformance Reporting and 
Corrective Action
Control of Non-metallic Materials
Program Milestone Review Require- 
ments
Safety Program Requirements 
Including Interface Between 
Safety and Reliability in 
Analysis Area
There are additional directives pending 
such as Control of Nonflight Hardware 
and Mission Support for Resolution of 
Flight Anomalies. The experiment gen- 
eral specification collects into a sin- 
gle document, all requirements with 
which an experimenter must comply. Pro- 
gram then tailored to suit particular 
experiment.
The program philosophy has evolved as 
follows:
Qualitative Reliability Goals
Long Duration Mission Approach
Wearout Analysis
FMEA's and SFP Control
Management Control System for SFP's
Application of FMEA/SFP Summaries 
to Mission Operations, Test Opera- 
tions, Inspection Planning
QUALITATIVE RELIABILITY GOALS FOR SKYLAB
We expect identification of failure 
modes, for various modes of operation, 
the categorization of failure modes by 
criticality and the establishment of 
explicit test and/or analysis require- 
ments pertaining to category 1 and 2 
modes. The establishment of contingency 
procedures for all category 1 and 2 
failure modes will be requirement.
Our goal is that no single failure will 
cause the loss of any crew member, pre- 
vent the continuation of the mission, or 
prevent a successful early termination 
of the mission.
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Prior flight and/or ground tests will 
have demonstrated that system elements 
are capable of meeting the mission re- 
quirements (including any special re- 
quirements associated with early 
termination). For those system elements 
which will not have been fully verified 
by prior flight and/or ground tests, 
engineering analyses will substantiate 
their capability of meeting mission re- 
quirements.
Failed parts analyses and corrective 
action, as appropriate, will have been 
accomplished for all failures experienced 
during the testing programs.
The establishment of design margins/ 
safety margins for all mission critical 
parameters is a goal for Skylab.
LONG DURATION APPROACH
Apollo common hardware is qualified to 
14 days. Skylab will not requalify 
hardware for longer mission duration 
lifetimes except in cases where opera- 
tion is critical to crew safety. Skylab 
will operate on "open-ended" mission 
concept assured by:
A. Reliability analysis for weak- 
link identification.
B. Assessment of past demonstrated 
test performance compared to Skylab mis- 
sion operating requirements and environ- 
ments.
C. Wearout analysis.
D. Redundant design.
E. Inflight maintenance.
WEAROUT ANALYSIS
Definition: Wearout will be considered 
to be present for any element or compo- 
nent whose likelihood or failure with 
time is expected to rise significantly 
prior to the end of the mission.
Approach: Wearout analysis shall cover 
the equipment required to operate during 
Skylab mission to the specified life- 
times. List the environments that cause 
wearout, examine each element or compo- 
nent to determine which environments may 
affect its life, determine if life ex- 
pectancy falls short of requirements, 
and recommend corrective actions for 
those that fall short. The environments 
to be considered shall include but not 
be limited to the following:
1. Abrasion (e.g., ball bearings, 
sliding contacts).
2. Mechanical deformation (e.g., 
teflon cold flow).
3. Corrosion.
4. Radiation (e.g., degradation of 
electronic components).
5. Electrolysis.
6. Chemical incompatibility (e.g., 
battery fluids, propellants).
7. Vacuum (e.g., change in materials 
characteristics caused by outgassing).
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS SINGLE 
FAILURE POINT IDENTIFICATION & CONTROL
Requirements:
1. Accomplishment of FMEA T s for all 
Skylab flight and flight support equip- 
ment .
2. Identification and analysis of SFP's.
3. Reporting of category 1 and 2 SFP's 
(and rationale for retention) at major 
program milestones.
4. Establishment of a management con- 
trol system to minimize impact of SFP's 
on crew safety and accomplishment of 
mission objectives.
5. Establishment of contingency/emer- 
gency procedures for category 1 and 2 
SFP f s.
6. Furnishing FMEA/SFP results to test 
planning as a primary consideration for 
test emphasis.
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM FOR SFP'S
Maintained by CCB controlled base- 
line listing of SFP's for stage/ 
module by subsystem
Begins at preliminary design review
Lists updated as design changes 
occur
CCB's charged with screening of 
ECP f s for SFP impact
Submitted for approval at major 
program milestone reviews
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APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP TO MISSION 
OPERATIONS
Reliability analyses are used to support 
preparation of mission rules. SFP's de­ 
fined contingencies which must be ac­ 
counted for in alternate mode operation 
and abort planning. These engineering 
studies make a significant input into 
in-flight fault isolation procedures.
APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP SUMMARIES 
TO TEST OPERATIONS
Used to select items to be tested
Establish operational modes to be
tested
Determine frequency of monitoring
Determine overall test emphasis
Use test data to update FMEA's
and SFP summary
APPLICATION OF FMEA AND SFP SUMMARIES 
TO INSPECTION PLANNING
Determine areas worthy of special 
skill training and certification
Determine critical procedural 
steps requiring inspection moni­ 
toring
Determine mandatory inspection 
points
Determine where detailed log 
steps for these mandatory in­ 
spection points are required
PRELIMINARY FMEA'S AND TRADE-OFF STUDIES 
DURING DESIGN BASELINING
Early requirement spelled out - 
preliminary FMEA and SFP at PDR. 
Most major modules and many ex­ 
periments managed to comply. 
Served as valuable tool during 
review and most of the detailed 
discussions at review centered 
on elimination of SFP's.
Typical kinds of trade-studies 
performed.
TYPICAL SELECTED TRADE STUDIES
—— CMG Life/Reliability Effects 
of a 14% Increase in Wheel 
Speed
—— Applicability of OAMS Anomaly 
to Skylab TAGS
—— TAGS Isolation Study
—— Skylab 1/2 Critical One Shot 
Functions
—— Attitude Pointing and Control 
System - Independent Reli­ 
ability Assessment
—-- Comparison of Failure Rates 
of Rate Gyro and CMG Sub­ 
systems
—— SRA - AM Condensing Heat 
Exchanger
—— SRA - Star Tracker Shutter 
Operations
—— SRA - EDCR 0146, DRL No. 
A3304
—— SRA - Inertial Reference
Integrating Gyro Life
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
Reliability Assessment is a minimal 
effort on Skylab. It is used primarily 
during design trade-offs as a relative 
evaluator on selected areas. Overall 
assessment is used to show long poles 
in tent for additional emphasis re­ 
quired. No formal system in place or 
required for continuing assessment. 
Primary emphasis is on FMEA/SFP con­ 
trols.
CANDIDATES FOR INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE
Known problems from wearout 
analysis (e.g., partial pressure 
oxygen sensor, molecular sieve, 
charcoal canisters, etc.)
Multiple use items which can be 
easily interchanged from one 
location to another (e.g., 
lights, circulating fans)
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Remote Emergencies
Patching kit for meteoroid 
puncture
Tool kit for wiring or plumbing 
repairs
SPECIAL RELIABILITY ANALYSES - SUSPECTED/ 
KNOWN TROUBLE AREAS
High Energy Source Study - Apollo 13
Equipment Functional Interchange 
Study - Apollo 13
Contamination Study Efforts - Out- 
gassing of Materials and Spacecraft 
Venting Affecting Optics
Problems of High Pressure GOX and 
Fuel Systems Resulting From Apollo 
13 Investigations
Skylab Functional Analysis - 
Important Data Base for Further 
Analysis
EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONAL INTERCHANGE STUDY
1. Has the interchangeable use of both 
high and low power electrical sources 
been maximized between the modules?
2. Are gaseous power sources switchable 
between the modules and CSM? Are common 
disconnects used in these systems?
3. Are the 02 and N2 sources common 
usage throughout the cluster?
4. Can telemetry and communications 
systems within the CSM be restored with 
cluster components?
5. Will existing hand tools be adequate 
to handle such repairs as wire splicing, 
crimping, cutting and connector assembly?
6. Can the IU be retained in the cluster 
as a backup computer?
7. Will water guns and associated hoses 
be common in the CM and OWS?
8. Has battery interchangeability and 
battery jury-rigging within the cluster 
been fully evaluated?
9. Will the drinking water guns in the 
OWS wardroom be compatible with the 
reconstitutable food bags?
10. Interchangeability of fans throughout 
the cluster has been designed into the 
EGS. Interchangeability between the 
cluster fans and the CM fans is ques­ 
tioned.
HARDWARE STORAGE AND REFURBISHMENT
The program is using residual Apollo 
flight hardware now in long term 
storage - SIB's, Saturn V's, I.U.'s, 
etc. Wearout analyses determined 
preparation for long term storage 
(corrosion control, removal for sepa­ 
rate storage, etc.). Storage life 
determinations dictate refurbishment 
test re-validation requirements and 
determines replacement hardware early 
in procurement cycle to avoid later 
problems. It also determines mainte­ 
nance procedures during storage to 
minimize degradation.
EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES 
Obj ectives:
For experiments assigned to 
Skylab and new experiments:
1. Reduce development costs
2. Reduce development rigor 
where possible
Approach:
Develop experiments in accord 
with effect on:
1. Crew safety
2. Mission objectives
3. Carrier integration com­ 
plexity
4. None of above
EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES
Provide four categories of 
experiments:
Experiments which, can, affect 
crew safety
Experiments which can, affect 
mission obj ecti ves
Experiments 'which, have carrier 
i n tegrat ion comp1 exity
Experiments which have .none 
of the above
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DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS 
THAT HAVE ELEMENTS THAT AFFECT CREW 
SAFETY
Requirement for submission and review of
I. Design and Development
Specifications*
Test Plans*
R&QA and Safety Plans*
FMEA*
Parts/Materials Listing*
Failure & Corrective Action
Reports* 
Status Reports* 
Design Reviews*
*Limited to the experiment 
elements that affect crew 
safety contents tailored 
to individual experiment 
needs.
II. Integration
Interface Requirements 
Checkout Requirements
III. Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE
IV. Operations
Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements
DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS 
THAT AFFECT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION 
OBJECTIVES
Requirement for submission and review of: 
I. Design and Development
Specifications
Development Plans
R&QA and Safety Plans
Test Plans
Drawings & Schematics
FMEA
Parts and Materials Listing
Configuration Control
Failures and Corrective
Action Reports
Status Reviews and/or Reports 
Cost Reports 
Design Reviews
Note: Contents of above tai­ 
lored to individual experiment 
needs.
II. Integration
Interface Requirements 
Checkout Requirements
III. Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE
IV. Operations
Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements
DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS 
THAT HAVE CARRIER INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY
Requirements for submission and review 
of:
I. Design and Development
Specifications 
Drawings and Schematics* 
Configuration Control* 
Status Reviews* 
Design Reviews*
*Limited to that needed to 
assure physical/functional 
interface integrity and 
assess availability of 
hardware.
Requirement for information 
on crew safety and mission 
objective impact assessment 
(essentially a minimal FMEA 
for identification of poten­ 
tial hazards - high pressure 
bottles, toxicity, flamma- 
bility, ignition sources, 
sharp elements, highly 
stressed springs, etc.)
Note: Skylab program is re­ 
sponsible for packaging and 
servicing to isolate experi­ 
ment failures from on-board
systems.
II. Integration
Interface Requirements 
Checkout Requirements
III. Hardware
Mockup(s) or Test Article(s)
Flight Article
GSE Hardware and Requirements
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IV. Operations
Crew Operations Requirements
Training Unit
Experiment Data Requirements
CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT TO CARRIER 
INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY
Experiments that cannot be deleted, 
removed or deactivated without signifi­ 
cantly affecting carrier checkout test 
operations or accomplishment of mission 
objectives are said to have carrier 
integration complexity. Their unavail­ 
ability or deletion would require sig­ 
nificant simulation of some type to 
allow carrier buildup and checkout 
operations to proceed.
DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES FOR EXPERIMENTS 
THAT DO NOT AFFECT CREW SAFETY, MISSION 
OBJECTIVES, AND DO NOT HAVE CARRIER 
INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY
I. Design and Development
No requirement for review or 
approval of specifications, 
tests, R&QA procedures, plans, 
configuration control, drawings, 
schematics, status reports, 
formal reviews and related docu­ 
mentation.
Requirement for information on 
crew safety and mission objective 
impact assessment (include min. 
FMEA) (potential hazards—high 
pressure bottles, toxicity, 
flammability, ignition sources, 
sharp elements, highly stressed 
springs, etc.)
Note: Skylab program is re­ 
sponsible for packaging and 
servicing to isolate experiment 
failures from on-board systems.
II. Integration
, Interface Requirements 
Checkout Requirements
III. Hardware
Flight Article 
GSE
IV. Operations
Crew Operations Requirements 
Training Unit (if essential) 
Experiment Data Requirements
CRITERIA FOR ASSIGNMENT TO "NONE OF THE 
ABOVE"
Experiment hardware which:
1. Have no failure modes that jeopar­ 
dize crew safety
2. Have no failure modes that prevent 
accomplishment of mission objectives
3. Carrier integration and interface 
not complex (i.e., removed or deacti­ 
vated without affecting flight module 
checkout operations or accomplishment 
of mission objectives.)
4. Successful operation of experiment 
hardware sole responsibility of experi­ 
ment developer. (NASA provides flight 
opportunity)
RELIABILITY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOKS
Purpose: To serve as a basic instru­ 
ment (tool) to be used by the con­ 
tractor^ reliability engineers in the 
performance of independent reliability 
assessments to support Headquarters in 
the identification, tracking and reso­ 
lution of the Skylab Reliability Areas 
of Concern (RAC f s).
Intent: To be an informal compilation 
of the complete Skylab reliability 
working knowledge such that Skylab 
RAC T s can be handled on a real time 
basis.
MANDATORY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOK DATA 
INCLUSION
1. Brief system definitions (extrapo­ 
late from system definition documents)
2. Concise functional descriptions 
(extrapolated from system definition 
documents)
3. Functional logic diagrams
4. Single point failure summaries
5. Significant failure and corrective 
action histories
6. Reliability goals (qualitative or 
quantitative)
7. Reliability Areas of Concern
8. Reliability problems
9. Chronological record of system 
changes and the associated logic
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10. A description of the system's opera­ 
ting parameters (i.e., pressures, volt­ 
ages, etc.) and margins (safety consum­ 
ables* etc.)
11. A description of the systems function
along with a time line showing "on" 
times, passive stages, etc.
12. Significant interface considerations
13. Life limitation/mission considera­ 
tions
SUPPLEMENTARY FUNCTIONAL NOTEBOOK DATA 
INCLUSIONS
(Guidelines left to discretion of indi­ 
vidual engineer)
1. FMEA's for major subsystems or 
components.
2. Schematics for major subsystems or 
components.
3. Any additional drawings and sche­ 
matics necessary for clarification of 
the system or components.
4. Program schedules related to func­ 
tion (PDR's, CDR's, meetings, etc.)
SPECIAL ANALYSES
The functional notebooks allow, when 
requested by Headquarters, special 
analyses to be performed and documented 
to aid Headquarters in the review, 
evaluation, and monitoring of the Skylab 
program. These analyses will be in the 
form of:
1. Special Studies
2. Trade-off Studies
3. Problem Analysis
4. Reliability Requirement/Goal Defi­ 
nitions
5. Reliability Assessments Evaluations
The special analyses then are utilized 
to update the functional notebooks.
meetings. This technical background is 
in the following areas:
1. Validating review data packages
2. Technical preparation for partici­ 
pation
3. Technical preparation for making 
inputs
4. Baseline comparison of the review 
and results
The functional notebooks are then up­ 
dated in accordance with the review 
results and applicable portions of the 
data packages.
"LESSONS LEARNED" REPORT
Deliberate plan to collect: 
Significant Problems 
Significant Occurrences 
Accident/Incident Descriptions 
Evaluation of Management Techniques
Checkout History - Effectiveness of 
Testing Plan
Workmanship Summary - Effectiveness 
of Inspection Effort
For use on future programs, pre-planning 
will hopefully produce well organized 
material in simple checklist format.
MEETING SUPPORT (MILESTONE REVIEWS, 
TECHNICAL REVIEWS, INTERCENTER PANELS)
The functional notebooks provide the 
technical background whereby support 
can be provided at milestone reviews, 
technical reviews and intercenter panel
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